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ABSTRACT
Long range, low power networks are rapidly gaining acceptance
in the Internet of Things (IoT) due to their ability to economically
support long-range sensing and control applications while provid-
ing multi-year battery life. LoRa is a key example of this new class
of network and is being deployed at large scale in several countries
worldwide. As these networks move out of the lab and into the real
world, they expose a large cyber-physical attack surface. Securing
these networks is therefore both critical and urgent. This paper
highlights security issues in LoRa and LoRaWAN that arise due
to the choice of a robust but slow modulation type in the proto-
col. We exploit these issues to develop a suite of practical attacks
based around selective jamming. These attacks are conducted and
evaluated using commodity hardware. The paper concludes by sug-
gesting a range of countermeasures that can be used to mitigate
the attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming a critical element of the in-
formation technology landscape and is predicted to grow rapidly in
scale over the coming decade. Contemporary IoT applications range
from consumer devices, through smart homes to safety critical in-
dustrial systems. Examples of IoT systems that demand strong secu-
rity support include: smart electricity grids [25], smart cities [26],
connected fleets of vehicles [26] and healthcare management [2].
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This vast diversity of end-devices and applications raises new
networking challenges, that have encouraged the development of a
rich diversity of network protocols and infrastructures.
Contemporary IoT networks may be classified according to their
physical radio layer, the bit rate they can achieve, the power con-
sumption or the communication range of the products. Networks
that operate over a small area or have to exchange a large amount of
data will be more inclined to use protocols such as Wi-Fi, Bluetooth,
or ZigBee [11]. Applications that demand long range, low power,
and can tolerate low bit rates will be inclined to use Sigfox, LoRa
or other sub-GHz low-power protocols [1].
This paper focuses on LoRa, a radiomodulation technology, upon
which the popular LoRaWAN network infrastructure is built. As of
today, the LoRa Alliance1 allows the deployment of both public and
private networks. The LoRa Alliance includes both public and pri-
vate operators, allowing it to be present in more than fifty countries,
and having ongoing collaboration with more than five hundred
operators2. This popularity, flexibility and freedom of deployment
motivates our interest in this technology. The LoRa physical layer
uses unlicensed radio frequency bands and is designed to achieve a
transmission range of a few kilometres with an emphasis on low
power consumption and low bit rate. The modulation exploits Chirp
Spread Spectrum (CSS) techniques, allowing it to be robust against
channel noise [22].
LoRa however has inherent drawbacks caused by compromises
that have been made in its design. First, the low bit rate of LoRa
messages means that the air-time of these messages is long which
makes them more prone to collisions. Second, LoRa messages are
susceptible to interference by other synchronous LoRa messages
if the signal strength of these messages is higher. LoRa’s defence
against these issues is three pronged: i) the low intended trans-
mission rate of LoRa devices limits the probability of collisions, ii)
channel hopping spreads messages across channels, reducing the
probability of collisions, and iii) LoRa devices can trade data rate
for sensitivity, to punch through noise [4].
In this paper we argue that while these defence mechanisms
attempt to minimise the likelihood and impact of accidental colli-
sions, they leave LoRa networks exposed to malicious interference.
By correctly timing LoRa-based jamming messages, it becomes pos-
sible to deliberately cause the collisions that the technology seeks
to avoid with a high success rate. Beyond that, this paper shows
that the long-air time of LoRa messages affords the time to perform
more sophisticated attacks, such as selective jamming (only jam
one device while leaving the others unaffected), and in some cases
a wormhole attack, where two devices that are networked using
1https://www.lora-alliance.org
2http://www.semtech.com/wireless-rf/internet-of-things/lora-applications/networks
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Table 1: Data rate, spreading factor andmaximumframe size
in LoRa packets [12]
DataRate Configuration Maximum Frame Size (bytes)
0 LoRa: SF12 / 125 kHz 59
1 LoRa: SF11 / 125 kHz 59
2 LoRa: SF10 / 125 kHz 59
3 LoRa: SF9 / 125 kHz 123
4 LoRa: SF8 / 125 kHz 230
5 LoRa: SF7 / 125 kHz 230
6 LoRa: SF7 / 250 kHz 230
faster technologies can record, jam, and replay recorded messages
over time to prevent alarms from triggering while preserving a
facade of normal operation. This allows an attacker to temporarily
disable specific LoRa devices or even to eliminate select messages.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview
of the LoRa environment and its related standards, along with con-
tentious issues. Section 3 explores these coexistence issues and
proposes to exploit them via three different and complementary
jamming-based approaches. We detail the design and implementa-
tion of these three attacks in Section 4 and evaluate them in Sec-
tion 5. In Section 6 the applicability of these techniques to real-world
use cases is discussed, and a set of practical scenarios maximising
the usefulness of these three techniques is proposed. Section 7 pro-
poses a set of mitigation techniques based on various abstraction
levels to reduce the impact of these attacks. We then conclude this
paper and discuss plans for future work in Section 8.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 LPWAN
Internet-of-Things (IoT) applications are starting to adopt a new
family of long range communication technologies because of their
low power consumption and low cost. These technologies are part
of the Low-Power Wide-Area Network (LPWAN) class of networks.
LPWAN is comprised of a set of wireless standards targeted for IoT
applications with long range communication (in the order of kilo-
metres) and low data rate requirements [7]. Since IoT applications
are expected to last for a long period on a single battery, LPWAN
technologies are designed to consume low power. LoRa and Sigfox
are the leaders in the LPWAN market. These technologies typi-
cally follow a star topology, which means the IoT end-devices with
sensors and actuators connect directly with a gateway. This opera-
tional model not only minimises deployment complexity, but also
promotes further adoption of IoT in the context of smart cities [6]
and the Industrial IoT [7].
Sigfox supports long range and low-power communication through
binary phase-shift keying modulation scheme. However, Sigfox
does not provide support for private deployments and instead re-
quires users to connect to a licensed Sigfox provider. In contrast,
the market model of LoRa is flexible as it enables any customer to
setup their own LoRa ecosystem. Furthermore, companies such as
COMCAST, KPN, and Actility are deploying public LoRa networks
to meet market demands3.
3https://www.lora-alliance.org/member-list
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Figure 1: Air time of packets in function of spreading factor
(SF) and packet size.
2.2 LoRa
LoRa is a long range and low power communication technology
based on the Chirp Spread Spectrum (CSS)modulation. The CSS [22]
modulation scheme uses a chirp signal, which determines spreading
across the spectrum. A chirp is a frequency modulated pulse. The
frequency can change in a monotonic manner from a lower value
to a higher value within a certain time (an upchirp) or it can change
from a higher value to a lower one (a downchirp). The duration
of these chirps is determined by the spreading factor (SF) that de-
termines the sensitivity and transmission speed. Lower spreading
factors enable faster transmissions at the cost of minimum sensi-
tivity, while higher spreading factors result in slow transmissions
with greater sensitivity. Figure 1 shows the relationship between
spreading factor and time-on-air. In LoRa, time-on-air is the time
duration of a LoRa signal. In addition, the data rate of LoRa is de-
termined by the spreading factor. At higher spreading factors, each
data bit is represented by multiple chirps, which reduces the data
rate. Table 1 shows how spreading factor (SF) influences the data
rate of LoRa, and the maximum packet size allowed for each SF.
The LoRa Alliance proposes the LoRaWAN [12] specification to
regulate medium access for LoRa end-devices. LoRa operates at the
Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) radio bands, and LoRaWAN
defines the operational frequencies in different regions as shown in
Figure 3. Furthermore, the telecommunication authority (such as
ETSI in Europe and FCC in USA) of the operational region define
duty cycling rules for ISM bands. Each LoRa end-device is expected
to adhere to the duty cycling regulations.
LoRaWAN follows a star topology, in which all end-devices con-
nect directly with a LoRa gateway. LoRaWAN classifies the end-
devices into three categories: Class A, Class B and Class C (See
Figure 3). Class A end-devices support bi-directional communica-
tion, in which each end-device has two short down-link receive
windows after an uplink transmission. Class B end-devices also
support bi-directional communication, but they have additional
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Figure 2: A LoRaWAN Packet.
Figure 3: The LoRaWAN stack.
receive windows, which are determined by time-synchronised bea-
cons from the gateway. Finally, Class C devices allow continuous
reception of data due to their maximal receive slots. At the time
of writing, only Class A devices are available in the market. In
Class A mode, the end-device can transmit messages with or with-
out acknowledgement. Transmissions with acknowledgements are
expensive in terms of energy, and may exhaust the duty cycling
allowances.
LoRa is a promising technology for IoT, and its architectural
model is similar to that of mobile phones, as the public LoRa de-
ployments allow end-devices to connect to a LoRa gateway for a
small subscription fee. This operational model coupled with the
wide-spread adoption of IoT has increased the number of LoRa
applications. For example, [18] presents the application of LoRa
in a health-care IoT scenario for monitoring blood and vaccine
supplies in DR Congo. In addition, LoRa is widely used in appli-
cations such as fire detection, radiation leak detection and home
security4. Given the growing interest in LoRa, and the criticality of
these applications, it is important to ensure the security of LoRa
communications.
2.3 LoRaWAN Packets
The structure of LoRaWAN packets is defined by the LoRaWAN
specification and is depicted in Figure 2. As observed, the transmis-
sion is initiated by a preamble then followed by radio link layer
4http://www.semtech.com/wireless-rf/internet-of-things/lora-applications/briefs
packets wrapped around MAC packets. Inside these MAC packets
are the data used by the upper layers of this model such as encryp-
tion integrity related data or application data. The hierarchy of that
stack is illustrated in Figure 3. The preamble is used by receiving
devices to detect and lock on a LoRa signal and is composed of a
variable number of upchirps, which depends on the modulation set-
tings, followed by two upchirps and two and a quarter downchirps.
At this stage, the receiver is only aware of a device emitting a LoRa
frame and unable to differentiate which device is emitting. This
preamble synchronises the receiver with the reception offset as
detailed in [5], and is a key element to detect precisely when the
message part of a LoRa frame will begin to be transmitted. The
preamble is critical, as the LoRa standard operates in the ISM radio
bands, shared with license-free communication applications, where
detecting the emission of a particular frequency is not enough to
identify any transmission.
The MAC layer sits above the physical layer, and is responsi-
ble for mediating access to the channel as well as encryption of
application data following the specification described in [12]. The
MAC layer is first composed of a MAC header stating the message
type. It is then followed by the MAC layer payload, which em-
beds the encrypted application payload. The physical layer payload
is then terminated by the first four bits of the Message Integrity
Code (MIC). The message is signed with AES-128 CMAC proce-
dures, following [22] as indicated in [12]. It is important to note
that the messages of the MAC layer are signed by a dedicated key
known as the NetworkSessionKey (NwkSKey). LoRaWAN derives
NwkSKey and Application Session Keys (AppSKey) from 128-bit
AES key known as the Application Key (Appkey). The AppSKey is
used for encrypting and decrypting the payload of application data.
LoRaWAN creates a key stream using NwkSKey, AppSKey, and the
up-link or down-link frame counter. Therefore, each message is
encrypted by using the XOR operation with the corresponding key
from the key stream to generate the encrypted payload. The MAC
payload is comprised of the FrameHeader (FHDR), a port field, and
then the encrypted application payload.
The FHDR is of special importance for our work, since its first four
bytes represent the end-device address (DevAddr). Furthermore, this
part of the MAC payload is not encrypted, which makes LoRaWAN
packets susceptible to selective jamming attacks.
2.4 Coexistence Issues in LoRa
Related work on LoRa focuses on two aspects of LoRa message
collisions; the impact of collisions, and their likelihood. As the
LoRaWAN protocol does not rely either on channel sensing nor on
time synchronisation for collision avoidance [12], its main defence
against collisions is the low data-rate of the end-devices on the
network, making these collisions unlikely[13]. This assumption has
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Figure 4: Calculated co-channel rejection thresholds for all
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(IS) spreading factors. In each case, if the result of the oper-
ation ISstr enдth − DSstr enдth is above the relevant threshold
(i.e., inside the coloured areas), the desired signal will be lost.
Adapted from [5].
been found to be far from robust in large scale LoRa deployments
however, with coexistence issues being the focus of several papers
[4, 19]. Packet loss is worse when bi-directional communications
are used [15], although this is also linked to duty cycle limitations
being exhausted by ACKs rather than just collisions.
LoRa packet collisions do not always result in packet loss, as
the use of CSS enables LoRa gateways to receive simultaneous
messages if these are at a different spreading factor (SF), and if
these messages are received at a similar power. These collisions
matter however when either the messages share the same SFs (the
signals are summed and both lost), or one message is transmitted
with significantly more power than the other. In the latter case, the
more powerful signal is received, while the weaker is disrupted and
lost (this also applies to the same SF case) [5]. Figure 4 illustrates this
by showing the thresholds above which interfering LoRa signals
overpower other LoRa signals, for each SF combination.
2.5 LoRa Jamming
Jamming is well studied in many radio technologies, such as Wi-Fi,
Bluetooth, Zigbee, etc [10, 21, 23, 24]. By abusing the coexistence
issues described above, it is possible to jam LoRa messages using
well timed malicious transmissions. Previous work on this topic
[3] showed the long air-time of LoRa messages made this triggered
jamming (as opposed to continuous) possible and effective. The
setup described there jams any LoRa message broadcast on the fre-
quency the jammer is listening to. This paper proposes to improve
this approach by extending it with selective jamming capabilities.
Selective jamming requires the classification of messages as they
are on-air. By classifying the message, a malicious jammer can
systematically jam either a particular type of message or all mes-
sages coming from a particular end-device [16]. As discussed in
Section 2.3, LoRaWAN message headers are not encrypted, which
enables selective jamming of LoRaWAN transmissions.
3 LORA JAMMING ATTACKS
As described Section 2, the LoRa physical layer suffers from coexis-
tence issues. LoRa devices which send data simultaneously using
certain frequencies and parameters can corrupt each other’s signal.
By abusing this vulnerability (i.e., increasing the chance of simulta-
neous transmission from random to guaranteed), it is possible to
jam LoRa messages maliciously.
Table 2 shows four identical LoRaWAN messages as seen by
the receiver during the selective jamming experiment detailed in
Section 5. In the last three cases, the jammer is active and corrupts
the message, changing the last bits of the message. As can be seen,
the first 11 bytes of the packet are not corrupted even when the
jammer is active due to the selection time (more of the message
should be corrupted in the triggered jamming case). These changed
bits cause the message to fail the cyclic redundancy check (CRC),
causing the message to be rejected before high-level interpretation
by the gateway. This section describes three different techniques
to perform this jamming and highlights their requirements and
applications.
3.1 Triggered Jamming
In order to avoid simultaneous transmissions, LoRa radio modules
have the capability to scan a certain channel to detect whether
there is an ongoing LoRa transmission or not (although the use of
this capability is not required by the protocol). This capability can
also be abused by attackers to detect activity on the channel. Once
a LoRa transmission is detected on the channel, the malicious LoRa
device can start transmitting in order to jam this transmission.
We tested this triggered jamming technique in our previous work
[3]. For each SF, we sent 100 messages on the 868.1 MHz frequency
and only 3 messages out of 600 (0.5%) reached the gateway when the
triggered jammer was on. This vulnerability in the LoRa physical
layer allows malicious entities or third parties to use off-the-shelf
LoRa devices to increase packet loss in a specific network. In addi-
tion, the triggered jammer described here provides a good base for
the development of more sophisticated jamming techniques, such
as Selective Jamming.
Table 2: LoRa messages as recorded in the radio module FIFO right after receiving, with and without jammer present.
Type Device Address Frame Headers FPort Payload MIC CRC Jammer Active?
40 63 56 34 12 00 00 00 01 40 D2 83 92 A8 C8 EB F3 No
40 63 56 34 12 00 00 00 01 40 D2 5D F6 71 DA EB CB Yes
40 63 56 34 12 00 00 00 01 40 D2 3D 9A 1A 7A C7 99 Yes
40 63 56 34 12 00 00 00 01 40 D2 34 90 D6 F5 FF 69 Yes
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Figure 5: Timing of Triggered and Selective Jamming.
3.2 Selective Jamming
Selective jamming is arguably the most sophisticated and efficient
jamming technique [23]. Since triggered and continuous jamming
[14] affect all the devices on a certain frequency, they are easily de-
tectable and simple countermeasures against these techniques can
be taken [17]. For instance, a particular frequency or network can
be marked as jammed, or network administrators can take action,
such as changing the communication frequency or enabling channel
hopping. Selective jamming on the other hand jams only selected
devices or messages, and since the other devices or messages in the
network are not jammed, can be much harder for the operator to
decide if a device is being jammed or some other technical problem
has occurred.
Triggered jamming simply relies on detecting preamble symbols,
and then jamming the devicewithout demodulating or decoding any
other part of the signal. Selective jamming requires some part of the
message to be received and read before action is taken. The decision
to jam or not is then made by applying a jamming policy to that
content. The policies could consider any of the message headers:
message type, device address, frame counter etc. This technique
has strict timing requirements that need to be achieved in order to
perform accurately. The jamming policy is only concerned with the
content following the physical headers. Thus, the time remaining
to successfully jam the packet is shorter in selective jamming. The
difference in timing requirements between triggered and selective
jamming is shown in Figure 5 and also detailed in Section 6.1.
3.3 Combining Selective Jamming With A
Novel Wormhole Attack
A classic wormhole attack requires two malicious devices amongst
a network (E.g., a sensor network). One of the malicious devices
receives normal network messages and tunnels them to the other
device via a low-latency link. The other device then receives these
messages and replays them in a different part of the network to
enact an attack [9]. Generally, this type of attack is used to create
false route information and routing loops to waste the energy of
networks that use mesh topologies [8]. However, in a LoRaWAN
network, the nodes are typically in a star-of-stars topology with
gateways forming a transparent bridge. Thus, the classical form of
the wormhole attack is not suitable for LoRaWAN networks. As
mentioned previously, the LoRaWAN protocol offers a mechanism
to prevent replay attacks. Once the MIC of a message is validated by
a gateway, any further occurrences of the same sequence number
will be rejected.
There is no time related information in LoRaWANmessage head-
ers, and only loose timing requirements due to LoRa’s long trans-
mission times. This means that if a message can be recorded and
prevented from reaching a gateway, it can be replayed at a later time
and appears as a legitimate message, as long as no message with a
higher sequence number has been received by the gateway. The sin-
gle device selective jamming attack described above cannot achieve
this alone, as conventional radio transceivers cannot simultane-
ously send and receive. This jam and replay attack therefore needs
two devices: a sniffer and a jammer. The sniffer receives messages
and decides whether to jam as per normal selective jamming. If the
decision to jam is made, it signals to the jammer via a low-latency
link, and the jammer immediately jams the message. Unlike the
selective jamming attack, the sniffer keeps listening to the original
transmission and stores it for later use in a replay attack.
The two devices have to be kept far enough apart so the jammer
does not jam the sniffer and therefore prevent the recording of
the original message. Ideally then, the sniffer is close to the source
device, and the jammer close to the gateway to maximise received
signal strength in both cases. This attack can be used in practice
to hide changes in a sensor’s state: normal operation messages are
jammed and recorded for a while, then during the activity that
is to be hidden the sensor messages continue to be jammed. Dur-
ing both phases, the normal operation messages are replayed at
a delayed rate to keep apparent sensor values in normal ranges.
This simulates packet loss but normal operation otherwise. The
timing requirements of this attack are even more strict than selec-
tive jamming due to the communications latency between the two
devices.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
The attacks described in the previous section were implemented
using cheap commodity hardware for their evaluation. This section
presents the details of each of these implementations.
4.1 Selective Jamming
In order to selectively jam LoRaWAN messages, a jammer needs to
be able to perform the following.
(1) Detect a LoRaWAN packet.
(2) Start receiving that packet.
(3) Abort receiving if the received content triggers the jamming
policy.
(4) Immediately jam the channel.
We suggest a simple architecture based on commodity hardware
to implement this technique. This architecture is shown in Figure
6. To implement this architecture, we needed a radio module capa-
ble of sending and receiving LoRa packets and software to cycle
through these steps. Some of the LoRa radio modules in the mar-
ket only support limited, high-level, sets of commands via serial
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Figure 6: Selective Jammer Architecture.
interface. However, selective jamming requires low-level configu-
ration to be done, to allow reading of a message while it is being
received and to perform jamming. There are only two devices on
the market that allow us to do these low-level configurations: the
Semtech Sx12765 and the Hope RFM95/966 radio modules. Both
radio modules communicate via SPI interface. Therefore, any micro-
controller board that has an SPI interface can be used to configure
these modules. We used the RFM95 radio module together with an
Arduino based micro-controller to build our prototype jammer.
There is no support to read LoRaWAN messages byte by byte
in the radio module. However, this can be still accomplished by
reading the module’s FIFO buffer since the radio module uses DMA
towrite messages byte by byte tomemory. The RFM95 radiomodule
has a register that indicates the modem status. It sets a bit in the
modem register to indicate that a LoRaWAN physical header has
been fully received. Once the flag is set, the LoRaWAN message in
the FIFO can be read byte by byte, enabling the selection part of
the attack.
During the attack, the radio module starts in receiver mode
and waits to receives LoRa modulated signals. Once a message is
detected, if its physical headers are correct, the module starts to
write data to the FIFO buffer starting with the message type and
device address. The FIFO buffer is then read by software byte by
byte. Once enough bytes are read (5 bytes are enough to reach the
device address), the jamming policy is applied. If the message is to
be jammed, the device switches to jammer mode. Once jamming is
done, it switches back to receiver mode again.
4.2 Combined Selective Jamming and
Wormhole Attack
As described in Section 3.3, this attack requires two separate de-
vices, a sniffer and a jammer, which need to perform the following
operations, respectively:
For the sniffer:
(1) Detect a LoRaWAN packet.
(2) Start receiving and recording that packet.
5http://www.semtech.com/images/datasheet/sx1276_ 77_ 78_ 79.pdf
6http://www.hoperf.com/upload/rf/RFM95_ 96_ 97_ 98W.pdf
LoRa Radio Module
Arduino-based 
MCU Board
Raspberry Pi Raspberry Pi
LoRa Radio Module
Arduino-based 
MCU Board
GPIO GPIO
UDP
Socket
Sniffer Jammer
Figure 7: Wormhole Attack Setup.
(3) Send a signal to the jammer if received content is enough to
trigger the jamming policy.
For the jammer:
(1) Wait for a signal from the sniffer.
(2) Turn the jammer on once the signal is received.
Figure 7 shows the architecture designed for this attack. In this
setup, we used the same radio modules and Arduino boards that
we used for the selective jammer described in the previous section.
There needs to be a low-latency link (i.e., faster than LoRaWAN)
between the two devices to perform this attack correctly. We de-
cided to use UDP communications over Ethernet to connect these
two devices together. There are some hardware options that can
be found on the market that allow us to implement UDP communi-
cations such as Arduino Ethernet shields or embedded computers
such as Raspberry Pi 7, or Beagle Bone 8. We used two Raspberry Pi
to create this UDP socket. One of them is connected to the sniffer
and the other one is connected to the jammer via GPIO. Once the
sniffer decides a LoRaWAN message needs to be jammed, it sets
one of its external pins to a high state to assert an interrupt in the
Raspberry Pi. The Raspberry Pi then sends UDP messages to the
Raspberry Pi connected to the jammer. This second Raspberry Pi
sets one of its external pins to a high state to assert an interrupt in
the Arduino board. The Arduino board then turns the jammer on
immediately.
5 EVALUATION
5.1 Traffic Analysis
As mentioned in Section 2, packet size affects the air-time of LoRa
messages, which means that to test the effectiveness of the jammer
it is important to calibrate the size of the test packets. An analysis
of LoRaWAN traffic was performed using a MultiTech Gateway
9 and its logs to gauge the packet size of LoRa transmissions in
regular use. We recorded LoRa traffic in two locations, one in Eu-
rope and one in the USA. The first, on the KU Leuven campus in
7https://www.raspberrypi.org
8https://beagleboard.org
9http://www.multitech.com/brands/multiconnect-conduit
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Table 3: Selective jamming experiment
Packets received from:
Spreading
factor
Jammed
device
Control
device
Jam
percentage
7 10 1000 99%
8 13 1000 98.7%
9 9 1000 99.1%
10 10 1000 99%
11 1 1000 99.9%
12 6 1000 99.4%
Belgium, was performed over 6 days, totalling 1383 messages from
86 different device addresses bound for the local university gateway.
These messages were spread across 8 channels, as follows (in MHz):
867.1 (9.1%), 867.3 (10.7%), 867.5 (8.9%), 867.7 (10.3%), 867.9 (9.6%),
868.1 (17.1%), 868.3 (18.7%), and 868.5 (15.5%). The second, at an IoT
event in Philadelphia recorded traffic from commercial devices for
approximately two hours. The 87 recorded messages there were
spread over 9 channels, as follows (in MHz): 911.9 (11.5%), 912.1
(11.5%), 912.3 (12.6%), 912.5 (10.3%), 912.6 (12.6%), 912.7 (10.3%),
912.9 (11.5%), 913.1 (8%), 913.3 (11.5%). The packets averaged 18.6
bytes in the first case, and 20.3 bytes in the second. Both of these are
far lower than the maximum allowed packet sizes shown in Table
1. Considering 13 bytes of every message are consumed by headers,
this means that the average payload visible from the gateway was
5-6 bytes in the first case, and 7-8 bytes in the second. To ensure that
the jammer can jam the average sized packet, the slightly smaller
test packet size of 17 bytes was used as a baseline in the following
experiments.
5.2 Selective Jamming
In order to evaluate this attack, we used two MicroChip RN2483
Class A end-devices. To highlight the selective aspect, one of these
device was the jamming target, while the other was used as a
control, our aim being to only jam the first. Table 3 shows the
messages received and jamming percentage at the gateway during
the experiment. For each SF, 1000messages were sent from each device,
on the same frequency (868 MHz) enabling only one channel(868.1
MHz) on the end-devices. For all SFs, the jamming percentage is higher
than 98%.
5.3 Combined Selective Jamming and
Wormhole Attack
As described in Section 3, this attack is very time-sensitive, as the
overhead of the wormhole communications have a big impact on
the time to jam packets. To quantify that impact, we evaluated the
attack in two parts. First, wemeasured the latency that is introduced
by the hardware, the software stack, and the network between the
sniffer and the jammer. The wormhole setup was timed end-to-
end by having the Arduinos at either end of the setup flash an
LED after detection of a message to jam at the sniffer side, and at
the jammer side when sending jamming messages. This setup was
recorded fifteen times using high speed (240fps) video. The time
between both flashes was then measured by counting the video
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Figure 8: Time available to jam for various packet sizes
for each SF. Times above the threshold should be reliably
jammable.
Table 4: Wormhole attack experiment results. This table
presents the capabilities of theWormhole Jammer setup for
each SF/Packet Size pair. S : successful jamming (>95%), M :
mixed success (0-95%), F : failure to jam (<0%).
SF
Message Size 7 8 9 10 11 12
17 F F F M S S
27 F F M S S S
37 F F M S S S
47 F F S S S S
57 F F S S S S
frames between each flash. The mean observed time was 100.83ms,
with a standard deviation of 1.7ms.
Using the formulas given in LoRa documentation [20], it is possi-
ble to calculate an approximation of the air time of any given LoRa
message. By subtracting the given airtime of the first five bytes of a
message (enough to read the device address) from the total airtime
of a message, it is possible to calculate the jamming window of a
message in the case of selective jamming. If that window exceeds
the reaction time of the jammer, the message should be jammable.
Figure 8 shows this process applied to our jammer. Comparing
the reaction time calculated above to the projected time-on-air of
LoRa messages of increasing sizes (from 17, our baseline, up in
increments of 10), allows us to predict how large a message would
have to be to be jammable by our setup at lower SFs.
To quantitatively evaluate the accuracy of this model (i.e., what
SF/packet size pairs are actually jammable), we used a MicroChip
RN2483 module as jamming target, and sent 100 messages for each
SF/packet size pairs close to the predicted threshold of the model
described above. Table 4 shows the results of this experiment.
As shown in Table 4, the model correctly predicts that SF7 mes-
sages cannot be intercepted by this setup, and that SF11 and SF12
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messages are all jammable. The real-world performance for SF10
approximates the predicted performance, with 27 byte packets be-
ing consistently jammable, although the 17 byte packets should be
below the threshold but still get jammed in 40% of cases. For SF9,
the model predicts that 37-57 byte packets should be jammable,
27 byte packets right on the threshold, and 17 byte packets not
jammable. The actual results diverge somewhat, with 37 byte pack-
ets not consistently jammable (40%), whereas the model predicts
40ms of jamming time. Finally, the model has SF8 packet sizes 47-57
above the jamming threshold , while the experiment showed that
no SF8 packets were jammable.
It is worth noting that the LoRa time-on-air calculations are
only approximations, and as shown with this experiment can only
be used to gain a rough estimate of the likelihood of jamming a
packet when the prediction is close to the threshold. This model is
appropriate when considering bigger gaps however (> 40-50ms in
our case).
6 APPLICABILITY TO REAL-WORLD
SCENARIOS
6.1 Attack Limitations
The jamming attacks presented in this paper rely on two charac-
teristics of LoRa messages: i) the long air-time of these messages,
which affords the time to react to their presence, ii) and the possi-
bility of drowning out legitimate messages with jamming messages
broadcast with more power. To be successful, a jamming attack will
need to coordinate these two, which may be difficult in some cases.
6.1.1 Window of Opportunity. All of the jamming attacks
presented in this paper rely on a detection and reaction mechanism
to jam incoming messages. The selective jamming attack increases
the length of the detection time (compared to triggered jamming)
by having to read more of the incoming messages before triggering
the jamming. The wormhole attack adds a significant additional
delay to the reaction part of the process. As shown in Section 3.3,
this delay prevented our wormhole attack from jamming lower SFs,
especially at low packet sizes. The setup used in the experiment
relied on a cabled Ethernet as the low-latency link, a best case
scenario. In a real-case, the wormhole attack will likely need to use
a long-range fast wireless link, such as WiFi internet. To establish
the impact of the use of WiFi, the model presented in Section 3.3
can be used. The accuracy of the model was tested against the real-
world efficacy of the setup, allowing the model to be used in a more
general manner, to predict how usable alternative communication
technologies would be. By adding the networking time expected
for these alternative technologies to the setup’s built-in latency, we
can predict whether or not the technology is usable for a particular
SF and message size. The overhead of WiFi internet ( 10ms) would
still enable jamming of most higher SF cases.
Its is important to note that the experiments conducted in this
paper were done with commodity hardware with a total cost of
approximately 100 euros. The latency of the setup could be reduced
by writing a custom RaspberryPi driver or using more expensive
and dedicated hardware (e.g., FPGA boards), improving the success
rate at lower SFs.
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Figure 9: Effects of RSSI drop on jamming attempts.
6.1.2 Jammer Signal Strength. Signal strength is an impor-
tant factor in the ability of the jammer to jam a device. If, at the
gateway, the RSSI (Received Signal Strength Indication) of the jam-
mer is too low relative to the jammed device, the jamming attempt
will fail regardless of timing issues (See Figure 4 for the relevant
thresholds). Figure 9 shows the results of a jamming experiment con-
ducted at SF12. The figure shows the recorded RSSI of the Jammer
and the Jammed Device over time. According to [5], the calculated
threshold differential between jammer and source for jamming at
SF12 is 36dB, a value which is aligned with the results shown in
Figure 9. When the Jammer’s RSSI is around -40, almost all packets
are jammed, whereas when this RSSI dropped to around -60, some
packets leak through, with the jammed device’s RSSI recorded at
around -80 throughout. The RSSI of the jamming messages at the
gateway can be increased in three ways: 1) by moving the jammer
closer to the gateway, 2) increasing the output power of the jammer,
and 3) through the use of directional antennas.
6.1.3 Channel Hopping. The attacks presented in the previ-
ous sections make use of single channel hardware: the channel to
listen and broadcast on is set before doing either. This is in con-
trast to gateway hardware for example, which is able to listen to
multiple channels simultaneously. For our tests, the jammed device
was constrained to sending on a single channel, on which the jam-
mer was set to listen/broadcast. As shown in Section 5.1 however,
regular LoRa devices hop between channels each time they send
a message to avoid accidental collisions. To implement this attack
in a real scenario would require listening for messages on multiple
channels to know where to jam. This is possible through the use
of a multi-channel receiver such as found in LoRa gateways, or
by using multiple single channel chips such as those use in the
current setup. However this will moderately increase the price of
the required hardware.
6.2 Potential Targets
When discussing potential targets and real-world applications of
these attacks, it is important to note that the selective jamming
and the wormhole attack described in the previous sections are
designed to jam the gateway in order to prevent communications
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coming from an end-device to reach a gateway. If the scenario is re-
versed (i.e., jamming gateway to device transmissions), the process
would change to waiting for an end-device to start a transmission
sequence, then relying on a timer, jam the two subsequent receive
slots as their timing sequence is fixed in the specifications and
therefore predictable. This section explores the potential of each of
the attacks described in this paper, suggesting the best use for each
technique.
6.2.1 Triggered Jamming. In the triggered jamming case, the
jamming is applied as a blunt obfuscation technique, meaning that
any time the preamble of a LoRa transmission is detected, the jam-
mer starts to saturate the input stage of the receiver in order to
prevent any possible reception for the targeted gateway. This attack
is well suited to a massive perturbation of a set of gateways, dis-
rupting the running applications and the network indiscriminately.
While it jams any LoRa transmission, this technique is far from
being covert from the point of view of the network and application
infrastructure, as any application-level monitoring should be able
to detect this disturbance.
6.2.2 Selective Jamming. The selective jamming attack is in-
stead directed towards a particular set of end-devices, the goal being
to activate the jamming of messages coming from a particular end-
device at a particular time. The selectiveness of the attack makes it
suitable for preventing a specific event (e.g., changes in sensor data)
from being communicated to the gateway. This is especially effec-
tive against any device that sends messages only when a trigger
occurs, such as alarms might. Such an attack may spoil the blood
and vaccine supplies in case of medical fridge LoRa deployment in
Kikwit, DR Congo [18]. While the above describes jamming of a
specific device, this selective jamming can be done on any of the
headers in a LoRaWAN packet, as these are all broadcast in clear. For
example, jamming based on message type can have severe impacts
on a network, as for example all “join” messages could be jammed,
preventing all devices from joining or re-joining the network.
6.2.3 Combined Selective Jamming & Wormhole Attack.
The combined selective and wormhole jammer attack adds another
dimension to selective jamming by adding message replay capa-
bility. The replay requires additional setup (i.e., recording normal
operational messages ahead of time), but enables more sophisti-
cated attacks than selective jamming can achieve. By replaying
normal operation messages while jamming, the attacker can not
only intercept alert messages, but also make it seem as though
nothing out of the ordinary is happening.
These attacks can be combined for maximum effectiveness; while
the selective and wormhole attack is powerful, as shown in Section
5 it can only act reliably on high SF communications. By using a
triggered or selective jammer at a gateway close to a device to block
join attempts with that gateway, it is possible to force a device to
join a more distant gateway, forcing it to move to higher SFs, and
therefore enabling the selective and wormhole attack to operate.
7 MITIGATION TECHNIQUES
As discussed in Section 6.1, the attacks presented in this paper have
limitations which can be used against them. This section describes
a series of mitigation techniques that exploit these limitations and
the characteristic changes caused by these attacks, to recognise and
stop them.
7.1 Low-Level Techniques
By using the capabilities of LoRa itself, it is possible to reduce
the effectiveness of the jamming techniques described above. The
following list highlights possible approaches.
• Create dense LoRa networks with overlapping cover-
age regions: By deploying LoRaWAN end-devices within
the range of multiple gateways, we increase the reliability
of LoRa communication. This feature is critical in beating
jamming attacks, as to guarantee that a message is jammed,
the jammer must ensure it is heard at no gateway in the
network. Since the jammer requires high RSSI compared to
the end-device, the jammer is more effective when it is close
to the gateway. Thus, the jamming is more complex in the
presence of multiple gateways, as the malicious attackers
must map the gateways in range of each target end-device
to successfully jam the transmissions.
• Maximise the use of channel hopping. As described in
Section 6.1, LoRa devices hop between multiple channels
when sending messages as dictated by LoRaWAN specifica-
tion, to reduce the chance of collisions. The more channels
used, the more complex the jammer has to be, as it needs
to listen on all of those channels, forcing a move from basic
low-cost LoRa hardware, to more expensive multi-channel
LoRa receivers as found in gateways.
• Move to higher spreading factor (i.e., SF12) to beat jam-
mer RSSI. As pictured in Figure 4, the higher SFs require
higher dB differentials between the jammer and target mes-
sage. Although higher spreading factor transmissions afford
more time for the jammer to act, it still requires the jammer
to be closer to the gateway. Note that multiple transmissions
in higher SF quickly exhaust the duty cycle allowance.
• Beat jammer reaction time (Wormhole Only):
– Move to low SF to beat jammer reaction time. Reduc-
ing SF reduces the airtime of messages, which in turn
reduces the time the jammer has to react. This has several
costs however: i) Lower SFs have lower reliability and
lower range, and ii) Lower SFs require less power output
from the jammer to be disrupted.
– Drop packet size to beat jammer reaction time. As
shown in Figures 1 and 8, packet size has a significant
impact on message air time. Reducing the size of these
messages could allow messages to beat the jammer’s reac-
tion time.
7.2 Application-Level Techniques
By performing traffic analysis and profiling (at the gateway or
server level), it is possible to identify variations in the pattern of
incoming messages indicating the presence of a jammer, and to
trigger alarms or adaptations to the network. The following list
highlights potential approaches based on differing assumptions:
• When the transmission rate is known. If the entity doing
the traffic analysis is aware of the sending rate of the LoRa
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end-devices, it can easily identify unplanned changes in
traffic patterns, and react accordingly.
• When the transmission rate is unknown. In this case,
the normal rate of traffic needs to be established over time,
or through past continuous profiling. Once the baseline rate
is understood, it becomes possible to identify deviations.
In essence, the continuous monitoring and profiling of LoRa end-
devices is essential to prevent security attacks on LoRa end-devices.
LoRa gateways must incorporate mechanisms to allocate suitable
spreading factor for end-devices along with time synchronisation
and channel hopping to improve the security and the robustness of
large scale LoRa deployments.
8 CONCLUSION
This paper showed that LoRa and LoRaWAN are susceptible to
jamming attacks using low-cost, commodity hardware broadcasting
normal LoRa messages. Our work introduces a series of jamming
attacks on LoRa traffic, that exploit the weakness of LoRa messages
to interference caused by other synchronous LoRa messages of
higher signal strength. These attacks are enabled thanks to the
long air-time of LoRa messages, which allows for the detection of a
particular message and the emission of a jamming message while
the original message is still being broadcast. This paper presented
a selective jamming attack which reads enough of a packet to
assert its origin before jamming, and an attack combining selective
jamming and a wormhole attack that splits the jammer over two
devices connected by an alternative network. This setup allows an
end-device’s messages to be read and recorded close to the source,
while the remote node jams the message close to the gateway. The
recorded messages can then be played back in a delayed fashion to
make the device appear to be functioning normally. These attacks
were tested in a real LoRa testbed and proven to function. We
discussed the applicability and inherent real-world limitations of
these attacks, and proposedmitigation techniques, taking place both
at the application level and low level of a LoRaWAN infrastructure.
Future work will investigate the mitigation strategies described
in Section 7, and assess the effects of these attacks on the newer
classes of LoRa devices (B and C) when they are released. Finally,
we will explore the possibilities of cryptographic channel hopping
for LoRa, in order to render jamming attacks ineffective.
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